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chapter we explore options employers face when redesigning their pension plans to create positive
incentives for workers to voluntarily work past traditional early retirement age. Incentives may also
include work life programs such as eldercare and phased retirement, to help older workers balance their
work and family responsibilities.
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Chapter 7
Strategies to Retain Older Workers
Janemarie Mulvey and Steven Nyce

As the baby boomers begin to retire over the next two decades, their
exodus from the labor force will adversely affect the supply of labor available to employers. These retirement decisions will be affected by both
economic and noneconomic factors. For instance, generous early retirement subsidies in defined benefit (DB) plans, along with retiree medical
coverage, provide strong incentives for workers having these plans to retire
before age 65. In addition, factors influencing retirement go beyond the
economic issues: for example, many older workers must care for aging
parents, time demands that make full-time work challenging.
Looking ahead, then, many boomers will be searching for ways to transition into retirement rather than abruptly ending their working careers,
which will change the nature of retirement in coming decades. Some
employers will respond with strategies that encourage older workers to
defer retirement, while still preserving the ‘retirement promise’. Such
strategies could include work/life benefits including phased retirement
programs, which would permit phasing out of work slowly; they also might
involve employer-sponsored eldercare programs which help workers identify and evaluate caregiving alternatives for aging relatives or spouses.
This chapter begins by outlining the economic and demographic realities facing employers and spells out how these change the ‘retirement
promise’. To understand the process, we quantify the effect of several
factors on older workers’ retirement patterns, including early retirement
incentives in DB plans, retiree medical coverage, and various work/life
benefits including phased retirement and eldercare programs. Next we
estimate the potential increase in older workers’ labor force participation
from changing these benefit offerings, and we conclude that these will only
marginally offset expected gaps between labor supply and demand in the
coming decade.

The Nature of the Pension Promise
In the mid-1960s, when the baby boom generation began moving into the
workforce, the private pension system was largely unregulated. The seeds
of reform were sown during the Kennedy administration, prompted by
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funding, fiduciary, and vesting lapses that drew concern from many quarters (Sass 1997). These reform efforts faced immense political resistance by
both labor and business, but eventually they culminated in the Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974. One key element
of ERISA was the protection of employee benefits (Title 1): the law held
that private sector employers had an obligation to provide promised benefits and satisfy a set of requirements for managing and administering
private pensions and welfare plans. The law also granted workers a legal
‘vested’ right to their accrued pensions based on past service. Previously,
employees often lost their accrued pension when they left jobs before
retirement (Sass 1997).
Before the enactment of ERISA, many employees trusted that their
companies would stand by their benefit promises. However, some employers drafted their plans with protective language to avoid paying benefits at
all, raising questions about the soundness of the implied contract (Schieber 2003). Accordingly, the main thrust of ERISA was to protect accrued
benefits and to ensure that if a company went bankrupt, there would be a
federal insurance fund to cover those DB liabilities. It is worth noting that
ERISA did not require firms offering pensions to insure benefits that might
be accrued in the future; thus, the pension promise related mainly to
benefits accrued to date.
Since company pensions in the USA are voluntarily provided, sponsors
continually weigh the costs and benefits of providing this benefit to the
workforce. In addition to the tax benefits pensions offer, DB pensions have
also helped employers to shape their workforces in key ways. An initial
reason companies adopted DB plans was to promote an orderly retirement
process (Ghilarducci 1992), and many of these plans were coupled with
retiree health insurance as well. At that time, labor was plentiful due to the
wave of boomer workers. Of course, over time, employers discovered additional benefits of traditional DB plans, most important among them the
finding that they provided an important retention mechanism. Turnover
rates were lower in firms with pensions (Mitchell 1982) and tenure proved
to be higher (Turner 1993).
Notwithstanding the positives of DB plans, the costs of offering them
have risen substantially over time. For one, administrative costs of complying and funding these plans grew markedly following the implementation
of ERISA. One analyst found that administrative costs rose nearly three
times between 1981 and 1996 (Hustead 1998). For another, regulatory
actions during the 1980s also curtailed employers’ ability to fund their
future pension obligations. First Congress restricted the level of pension
funding allowable under the federal tax code with the Tax Equity and Fiscal
Responsibility Act (TEFRA) of 1982. Next, it changed full funding limits on
pensions, tying these caps to current liabilities instead of projected
benefit obligations, with the Ominous Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987
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(Schieber 2003). These policies prevented employers from pre-funding
their future obligations, so the size of unfunded DB liabilities began to
rise and threaten to grow further as the workforce ages.
Higher administrative costs and funding restrictions altered the fundamental economic value of employer-sponsored retirement plans particularly for smaller firms and those with lower wage workers (Clark et al. 2004).
For these organizations, it became more cost-effective to instead adopt a
401(k) plan, which partly explains why DB plans have declined in number
(Papke 1999). The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) in 1990
insured 87,564 small DB plans, with fewer than 1,000 employees; by 2003,
that number fell by 70 percent to only 25,812 plans (PBGC 2004). Larger
employers often maintain their DB plans because they are able to spread
the large administrative costs over a larger number of workers, yet even so,
funding restrictions and falling equity markets have accelerated the rate of
decline in that sector as well. Between 1990 and 2003, the number of PBGCinsured DB plans among firms with more than 1,000 employees fell 15
percent, from 4,335 to 3,700 plans (PBGC 2004).
Employers who have retained a traditional DB plan seek to adapt them to
the changing workforce and marketplace. One approach has been to
convert them to hybrid plans: for instance, in 2000, one in five DB participants worked for companies with hybrid pension plans (PBGC 2004). As
their name suggests, these hybrids combine features of both DB and
defined contribution (DC) pensions. Similar to a DC, a hybrid plan accumulates benefits in the form of a hypothetical account balance which is
paid out in a lump sum. Also like a DC, the benefits are portable; if the
worker leaves an employer before normal retirement age, the assets can be
rolled over and re-invested. Yet a hybrid plan retains many of the advantages of a traditional DB plan, in that the plan sponsor bearing investment
risk and it is federally insured by the PBGC.
Despite their advantages, growth in hybrid conversions has slowed substantially in recent years due to increased regulatory and legal uncertainty.
Some critics have argued that employers converting from a traditional DB
plan to a hybrid plan do so to cut costs at the expense of long-service
workers. Nevertheless, the data show that hybrid conversions since 1999
have actually increased plan sponsor pension costs by an average of 2.2
percent, and employers who converted their DB to hybrid plans also
protected older workers nearing retirement (Goodfellow et al. 2004).
That is, some 89 percent of plan sponsors implemented specific protections for older workers, including ‘grandfathering’ benefits, offering workers a choice between plans, and offering transitional credits. This suggests
that a better explanation for why firms have converted to hybrid plans is
that they are doing so to adapt to the changing workforce. Not only are
workers older, but they are more likely to change jobs, meaning that the
traditional backloaded DB plan is less attractive. For instance, research has

114

Janemarie Mulvey and Steven Nyce

found that industries with younger, more mobile workers and tighter labor
markets were most likely to undertake hybrid conversions (Coronado and
Copeland 2003). Clearly, as long as employer-provided pensions are a
voluntary benefit, it stands to reason that restricting hybrid conversions
may detract from both employer and employee well-being.

The Changing Demographic Landscape and Potential
Labor Shortages
As the leading edge of the baby boom generation approaches retirement,
labor markets face a massive exodus of talent over the next several decades.
How employers will adjust to these demographic changes will be very
important for the economy. Figure 7-1 illustrates the trend: growth rates
in the civilian US labor force from the 1950s through the 1990s, versus

Compound annual growth rate for the period
3.0

2.0

1.0

0.0
1950s

1960s

1970s

1980s

1990s

2000s

2010s

Figure 7-1. US civilian labor force growth rates for selected decades.
Source : Council of Economic Advisors (2004); Social Security Administration (2000).
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projections of slowdown thereafter. Indeed, Social Security Administration
actuaries estimate that labor force growth to 2010 will be only about 75
percent of that seen during the 1990s, and after that it will be only
about one-third as high. Consequently, a key question arises as to whether
growing demand for goods and services might outpace a slow-growing
workforce.
The demand for labor ultimately depends on the efficiency with which
workers are employed in producing output, and the level of output that
firms produce. In turn, output is driven by the demand for goods and
services and the role of international markets. The USA has historically
demonstrated a strong appetite for higher living standards, measured here
by gross domestic product (GDP) per capita.1 Table 7-1 illustrates per
capita GDP over the last half of the twentieth century, along with US
population estimates, and GDP levels in 1996 dollars. It is interesting that
per capita GDP growth over the last half century was fairly stable, notwithstanding year-to-year fluctuations.
There are several ways of estimating future national output levels.2 Here
we rely on ten-year macroeconomic projections developed by the US Congressional Budget Office (CBO), similar to private sector estimates of
economic growth projections (Lofgren et al. 2003). The last column of
Table 7-1 also provides our projections for growth in standards of living to
2020.3 Here we assume an annual real per capita GDP growth rate of 2
percent to 2010, an estimate consistent with the pattern of historical
improvement in standards of living. In the following period to 2020, the
growth in output per person is anticipated to slow to roughly 1.66 percent

Table 7-1 Population and Output Measures in the USA for Selected Periods
and Expectations for the Future
GDP in 2000
chain weighted
Resident
dollars
population
(in millions) (in billions)
1950
1960
1970
1980
1990
2000
2010
2020

152.3
180.7
205.1
227.8
249.5
275.3
299.9
324.9

1,777.30
2,501.80
3,771.90
5,161.70
7,112.50
9,817.00
13,030.50
16,646.90

Annualized
GDP per
GDP growth
capita in
rate from
prior date (%) 2000 (dollars)
3.48
4.19
3.19
3.26
3.28
2.87
2.48

11,669.73
13,845.05
18,390.54
22,658.91
28,507.01
35,659.28
43,449.48
51,237.00

Annualized growth
rate in per capita
GDP from prior
date (%)
1.72
2.88
2.11
2.32
2.26
2.00
1.66

Sources : CBO, Census Bureau and US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic
Analysis.
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per year, a rate of improvement roughly in line with previous periods. A key
determinant of strong economic growth, despite slower labor supply
expansion, is workforce productivity. Examining historical productivity
growth (average GDP per hour) may offer insights for the future. During
the 1950s and 1960s, average GDP per hour of labor grew at a rate of 2.66
percent per year, but over the last three decades, average annual growth in
productivity has been a modest 1.5 percent. Just recently productivity has
seen a resurgence, with the last half of the 1990s reporting a 2.1 percent per
year, and an average of around 2.3 percent in 2002 and 2003.4
These growth projections have important labor force implications. To
describe the challenges, we examine the relationship between the potential
labor supply and the demand for labor under a range of alternative productivity scenarios. The analysis begins by projecting labor supplies on the
basis of the existing workforce and expected changes in the population
over the coming decade.5 The most conservative projection scenario assumed that output per worker hour would rise at 1.5 percent per year, the
average rate of increase in output per hour over the past three decades. In
the second and third scenarios, we assumed that output per hour would
increase at a rate of 1.75 percent and 2.0 percent per year, respectively,
reflecting the ranges experienced in worker productivity growth during the
past decade. Two last scenarios assumed that output per hour increases at
2.44 percent and 2.23 percent per year, roughly in line with those of the
1950s and 1960s (but unmatched for any extended period since then).
Table 7-2 presents the results of these projections in terms of full-time
equivalent (FTE) workers.6 Our approach poses the problem as measuring
how much labor force participation rates of workers over age 55 would have
to change to meet the gap. Of course, boosting employment could also
happen at other age groups, drawing in more women and younger cohorts.7 Yet we focus on the age 55þ bracket, inasmuch as these workers are
Table 7-2 Labor Supply Gap under Alternative Productivity Growth Scenarios
(Millions)

Labor Supply FTE
Labor Demand FTE
at 1.5% Productivity
at 1.75% Productivity
at 2.0% Productivity
at 2.23% Productivity
at 2.44% Productivity

2010

2020

Gap 2010

Gap 2020

134.6

139.9

—

—

143.6
141.1
138.7
136.5
134.6

158.0
151.5
145.4
139.9
135.1

8.9
6.5
4.1
1.9
0.0

18.1
11.7
5.5
0.0
4.8

Source : Authors’ calculations from unpublished projections provided by the SSA (2001);
the US Department of Commerce (2004: D-3); Unicon (2003); the US Census Bureau
(2000: NP-D1-A); and the CBO (2004: Table E-1).
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those most affected by pension and other retirement programs over the
next two decades.
Under the most conservative productivity improvement scenario, there
will be a labor shortfall estimated at 6.6 percent in 2010, representing
roughly 8.9 million FTE workers. As seen in Table 7-3 the shortfall is
reduced when productivity rises. Labor supply will be sufficient to meet
labor demand only if productivity improvements meet or exceed 2.44
percent per year. Projecting further, to the year 2020, the gap between
labor supply and demand widens to 18.1 million FTE workers under the
most conservative scenario (a 13 percent shortfall). In order to close the
gap under the 2020 projection, labor productivity would need to sustain an
annual rate of 2.23 percent, if current workforce patterns persist. The fact
that the required productivity rate is lower for the 2020 scenario compared
to the 2010 scenario reflects the slowdown in output growth anticipated by
the CBO over the 2010s.
If the required boost in labor productivity is not achievable in the
coming decades, higher rates of workforce participation will be needed
to avoid disappointing future standards of living. Employers will either
have to entice some people into the workforce who are outside it today,
or convince their current workers to work longer hours. Since here

Table 7-3 Required Changes in Labor Force Participation Necessary to Meet
Future Growth Prospects under Alternative Productivity Growth
Scenarios
1.5% Productivity

1.75% Productivity

2.0% Productivity

2003

2010

2020

2010

2020

2010

2020

Males
55 to 59
60 to 64
65 to 69
70 to 74
75þ

77.6
57.2
32.8
18.8
8.3

105.6
77.8
44.6
25.6
11.3

124.1
91.5
52.5
30.1
13.3

97.9
72.2
41.4
23.7
10.5

107.5
79.3
45.4
26.0
11.5

90.4
66.6
38.2
21.9
9.7

91.6
67.5
38.7
22.2
9.8

Females
55 to 59
60 to 64
65 to 69
70 to 74
75þ

65.5
45.3
22.7
11.2
4.1

89.1
61.7
30.9
15.2
5.6

104.8
72.5
36.3
17.9
6.6

82.7
57.2
28.6
14.1
5.2

90.8
62.8
31.5
15.5
5.7

76.3
52.8
26.4
13.0
4.8

77.3
53.5
26.8
13.2
4.8

Source : Authors’ calculations unpublished projections provided by the SSA (2001); the US
Department of Commerce (2004: D-3); Unicon (2003); US Census Bureau (2000: NP-D1A); Congressional Budget Office (2004: Table E-1).
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we focus on the labor supply of older workers, Table 7-3 illustrates
how much rates would have to rise for males and females aged 55þ to
eliminate the labor supply shortage. As noted above, under our most
conservative productivity scenario, we estimate a 6.6 percent shortfall
for 2010, which rises to 13 percent by 2020. Under the 1.5 percent productivity improvement scenario, participation rates would need to rise by
more than one-third compared to current levels. For men aged 55–59,
participation rates would have to increase from 77.6 percent in 2003
to 105.6 percent by 2010. Likewise, female participation rates in the
same age cohort would have to climb from 65.5 to 89.1 percent over the
decade. These increases are implausible since then participation would
be above the natural limit of 100 percent for men, though people would
need to work increasingly longer days or hold multiple jobs. Looking at
the 1.75 percent and 2.0 percent productivity growth scenarios, participation rates would need to rise by 26.2 percent and 16.5 percent, respectively,
by 2010.8
If we extend the period out to 2020 under the 1.5 percent productivity
scenario, activity rates would need to rise by nearly 60 percent among older
workers over the next two decades to close the gap between labor supply
and labor demand. Participation rates for both males and females aged
55–59 would need to rise above 100 percent, of course an improbable
outcome. Under the 1.75 percent productivity scenario, participation
rates would need to rise by 38.5 percent, and for the 2.0 percent scenario
rates would have to increase by over 18 percent.
Next we turn to a discussion of how pensions and retiree medical plans
influence early retirement, and finally we evaluate several strategies that
employers can use to induce workers to retire later.

The Importance of Pensions and Retiree Medical Plans
to the Retirement Decision
These economic and demographic realities suggests that employers will
likely launch a search for strategies to retain their older workers. Because
DB pensions have the strongest early retirement incentives, these will
naturally be a prime target for change. Evidence suggests that early retirement subsidies in DB pensions and Social Security strongly influence the
decision to retire before normal retirement age (Coile and Gruber 2000;
Gustman et al. 1994). Traditional DB plans generally encourage early
retirement by offering early retirement subsidies and delayed retirement
penalties (Luzadis and Mitchell 1991). While most early retirement benefits are actuarially reduced to reflect a longer payout period, these reductions generally are small and tend to provide a more than actuarially fair
early retirement benefit. For instance, two-thirds of DB plans had an early
retirement subsidy in 1994 (Foster 1996).
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Table 7-4 Pension Coverage of Baby Boomers (1998)
Percent with Defined benefit plans

Boomers
(Age 33–52)
Younger boomers
(Age 33–42)
Older boomers
(Age 43–52)

Overall

Men

Women

( $30K

>$30K

32.4

33.6

31.1

23.6

43.7

28.9

29.7

28

21.5

39.4

36.7

38.5

34.6

26.4

48.3

Source : Verma and Lichtenstein (2003).

Though pension coverage has declined for the workforce as a whole over
the past decade, it is still prevalent among baby boomers, particularly the
older segment (see Table 7-4). Overall, 37 percent of the older set (age
43–52 in 1998) had a DB plan, more than the 29 percent of their younger
counterparts (age 33–42 in 1998). Men are slightly more likely to have DB
coverage than women, and baby boomers with income above $30,000 are
nearly twice as likely to be covered by a pension plan. In fact, among older
baby boomers with incomes above $30,000, almost half had DB coverage
(Verma and Lichtenstein 2003). Thus we expect that the incentives in these
plans will affect the retirement decision of boomers in 2010 and 2020.
Another factor that affects the timing of retirement is the availability of
retiree health insurance. This is particularly a concern for pre-65 retirees
who must purchase coverage in the retail marketplace. A recent Health
Confidence Survey reported that 60 percent of workers said they would not
retire before becoming eligible for Medicare, unless their employer provided retiree health benefits (EBRI 2002). Other evidence also confirms
that retiree medical plans encourage older workers to retire early (Karoly
and Rogowski 1994). Yet there is little consensus on the magnitude of these
effects, perhaps because these studies suffer from data limitations regarding pension plan availability, pension plan incentives, measures of the
value of retiree health insurance, and sample restrictions (Gruber and
Madrian 2002).
Also the impact of retiree medical plans on future retirees may decline,
since fewer companies are offering this benefit over time (McDevitt et al.
2002). Before 1980, employer-sponsored retiree health insurance often
accompanied DB pension plans, and more than 80 percent of medium
and large employers offered some form of retiree health insurance (Figure
7-2). By 2003, only 40 percent of medium and large firms offered a retiree
medical plan to active employees. The nature of the retiree health benefit
is also changing. Today’s retiree health plans are more likely to have
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100%

80%

60%

40%

20%

0%
1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1993 1994 1997 1999 2000 2001

Figure 7-2. Percentage of medium and large firms offering a retiree health plan to
active employees.
Source : Watson Wyatt Data Services (various years). These surveys were targeted at
medium and large firms.

contribution caps, service-related contributions, and substantial retiree costsharing (McDevitt et al. 2002). While few empirical studies have accounted
for these new plan design features, it is likely that these features will influence retirement incentives for the next generation of older workers.

Strategies to Retain Older Workers
Prior studies have found that early retirement pension provisions and
retiree medical plans help induce early retirement, but the magnitude of
these effects is, as yet, not firmly established. This is partly because of the
difficulties inherent in separating the effects of pension incentives from
retiree medical plans and other benefits.9 Additionally, previous studies
have been able to measure the existence of these plans, but they have not
evaluated specific pension and medical plan designs. Finally, prior researchers have not accounted for the potential inter-relationships between
work/life benefits and retirement incentives. These latter benefits, which
include both formal and informal phased retirement arrangements and
eldercare programs, may also influence retirement incentives.
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To fill these gaps, we employ a unique dataset that combines personnel
records with details about retirement plan design features. We have collected personnel files for forty-two large companies with DB pensions
plans, representing nearly 300,000 active workers. Of these employees,
37,428 are age 55þ, 72 percent of whom were eligible to retire. The
datafiles include demographic information for all employees on age, sex,
tenure, and salary; to this we have appended information on plan features
and dollar values of each worker’s pension and health benefits based on his
age, salary, and tenure derived from Watson Wyatt’s COMPARISONE
database. Using actuarial models, we compute the present value of each
worker’s pension benefit at the earliest age of eligibility or attained age, if
later, as well as the worker’s normal retirement age in the plan. Information is also available on the features of retiree medical plans if they were
offered. Finally, we have information on work/life benefits including the
existence of phased retirement programs and eldercare programs. Using
these data, we explore three simulated scenarios.
Strategy 1: Reduce Economic Subsidies in Early Retirement Benefits. The
vast majority (95 percent) of all DB plans offer some form of early
retirement benefit (Mitchell 2003), with the size of the early retirement
subsidy depending on the extent to which the normal retirement benefit
is reduced, when calculating early benefits. The intent of the early
retirement reduction factor is to adjust early benefits to account for the
fact that benefits will be paid out over a longer number of years. As a
rule of thumb, actuaries suggest that an early reduction factor of 60
percent is actuarially fair for a 55 year old; reductions of 40 percent
and 30 percent, respectively, are roughly actuarially neutral for a 60 and
62 year old.10
We also point out the difference between an actuarially fair benefit and
an economically fair benefit.11 The actuarially fair reduction does not
account for additional years and wage growth a worker would attain, if he
or she delayed retirement until the plan’s normal retirement age, whereas
the economically fair benefit does. So even though an early retirement
benefit is actuarially subsidized, it might not be seen as embodying an
economic subsidy. That is, an economic subsidy exists if the present value
of the early retirement benefit exceeds or equals the present value of the
normal retirement benefit. In our sample, 28 percent of workers eligible to
retire had an economic early retirement subsidy.
To estimate how an economic subsidy influences retirement, we created
an indicator that equaled one when the present value of the early retirement benefit was greater than or equal to the present value of the normal
retirement benefit. Results in Figure 7-3 show that the economic pension
subsidy reduced the average retirement age by nearly 9 months for men
and 10 months for women.
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With economic
subsidy in pension

Retiree health
insurance

Retiree health with
premium caps

Retiree health with
service-related
premiums

−25

−20

−15

−10

−5

0

Change in retirement age (in months)
Men
Women

Figure 7-3. Effect of retirement plan provisions on retirement ages.
Source : Authors’ estimates using coefficients presented in Table 7–A1.

Strategy 2: Change the Nature of Retiree Medical Benefits. As noted
above, while having retiree health insurance boosts the likelihood of early
retirement, there is little consensus on the magnitude of this effect.12 For
our sample of DB participants, 83 percent had retiree medical plans, which
we find reduces retirement ages by 1.6 years for women and 9.4 months for
men (although the effect is less statistically significant for men; Figure 7-3).
If the prevalence of these plans falls in the future, this could significantly
impact labor force participation rates. Of course, while the existence of the
plan is important, the design features of plans are also important. In our
sample, 28 percent of workers with retiree medical plans also faced capped
employer premiums, and as this becomes more prevalent, employers will
seek to pass on future retiree medical cost increases to the plan participants
(McDevitt et al. 2002). This will have an impact on retirement ages
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according to our findings. If retiree medical insurance is available, but the
plan has premium caps, this substantially offsets the tendency to retire
early. For our dataset, for instance, retirement ages decline only by 2.7
months for men (6.6 months minus 9.9 months), and 7.2 months for
women (1.0 months 1.6 months).
A second design feature of retire medical plans has to do with servicerelated premiums, by which we mean that employers link their premium
contributions to the worker’s tenure with the firm. In our dataset, 27
percent of firms with retiree medical plans had service-related premiums.
If the retiree medical plan had such service-related premiums, retirement
ages only declined by 8.5 months for women (versus 1.6 years if retiree
medical coverage lacked service-related premiums). There is no significant
effect of service-related premiums on men, perhaps because men in the
sample had longer tenure. Philosophically, it makes sense to align retirement benefits with service which makes them more consistent with traditional DB pensions.
Strategy 3: Implement Work/Life Benefits Like Eldercare and Phased
Retirement. While changing early retirement subsidies and retiree
medical plans may help some employers achieve deferred retirement,
some firms face pressure to preserve benefits for workers close to
retirement. Consequently, there is a need for other ways to offer older
workers incentives to remain on the job. Integral to these offerings is the
element of time, since employees’ time on the job competes against other
demands including time spent with family, travel, volunteerism, and other
activities.
A particularly time-consuming activity of much concern to older workers
has to do with caregiving responsibilities for aging parents, grandchildren,
or other relatives. It is estimated that 17 percent of the workforce is actively
involved in providing care for an older family member or friend (National
Alliance for Caregiving 2004). Caregivers report that they incur significant
losses in career development, salary and retirement income, and substantial out-of-pocket expenses, as a result of their caregiving obligations
(Metlife 1999). Approximately 10 percent of working caregivers retire
early because they cannot successfully balance the demand of career and
family (National Alliance for Caregiving 1997). In addition, we have calculated from the Current Population Survey that for women age 55–64 who
exit the workforce, 23 percent report they left to take care of family.
To the extent that employers can help alleviate these caregiving responsibilities, they may free them up to work longer. One approach is to offer
eldercare programs, which help employees identify, evaluate, and
contact eldercare services. Some also provide a social worker to work with
families to identify various alternatives given their work situations and
incomes. When relatives need more intensive care, these services help
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locate home health aides and even help find high-quality nursing homes.
In our datafile described above, one-quarter of older workers eligible to
retire had access to eldercare programs.
Another way that employers can help their workers address caregiving
needs is to develop phased retirement programs allowing them more time
to care for an aging relative. Phased retirement programs allow workers to
slowly transition into retirement and can include part-time work or flexible
schedules. Our database suggests that 40 percent of employers provide
flexible work schedules for their employees, and a separate Watson Wyatt
survey found that 16 percent of large employers offer some type of formal
phased retirement program.
While our analysis shows that eldercare assistance and phased retirement
programs do encourage workers to delay retirement, the results differ by
gender (see Figure 7-4). Men tend to be more responsive to eldercare
programs but less to phased retirement programs, while women have the
opposite response. This discrepancy reflects the fact that the nature of
caregiving responsibilities often differs by sex (Metlife 2003); for instance,
men are more likely to be long-distance caregivers and provide financial

Phased
retirement

Elder care

0
Men
Women
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20

Change in retirement age (months)

Figure 7-4. Effect of work/life benefits on retirement ages.
Source : Authors’ estimates using coefficients presented in Table 7–A1.
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support rather than actual personal care services. In addition, men tend to
help more with nonpersonal caregiving events that can be scheduled
around a workday. The services provided by eldercare assistance programs
seem to meet those needs. In fact, our analysis shows that employerprovided elder care assistance programs increase the average retirement
age of men by eight months, while the same programs increase the average
retirement age of women by only one month. Women, on the other hand,
are more likely than men to help with ‘hands-on’ personal care services like
feeding, dressing, bathing, and transferring.
This is particularly relevant since a recent Metlife (2003) study found
that women were more likely to report that they are leaving their jobs as a
result of caregiving responsibilities (20 percent) compared with men (11
percent). Therefore, the flexibility offered by phased retirement programs
often can addresses women’s caregiving needs more effectively than do
eldercare assistance programs. Overall, one-quarter percent of older workers appear to phase out of work (Quinn 1999), and women constitute the
majority of phasers (Mulvey 2004). In addition, the desire to phase and the
intensity of caregiving activities are related. Of workers who phased, 30
percent of female phasers provide care to a family member, while only
19 percent of male phasers have caregiving responsibilities.13 Our analysis
supports these trends and shows that the existence of a phased retirement
program increases the average retirement age among women by 21
months. For men, phasing increased average retirement age by about 5
months.
To put each of these scenarios in perspective, we combine our analysis of
labor supply and labor demand in Figure 7-5. This illustrates the predicted
impact on the gap between labor supply and demand if employers were
attempting to delay retirement ages for eligible workers by one, two, or
three years. We find that a combination of these strategies might raise the
average retirement age for men and women by nearly two years. This would
have a measurable impact on the gap between labor supply and demand, of
11 percent in 2010, and 17 percent in 2020. It is possible that the remaining
shortfall could be met by increasing labor force participation among workers age 65þ and among younger women. Indeed, Nyce and Schieber
(2002) report that women’s labor force participation rates would have to
rise only about 3.5 percentage points in order to close the gap, assuming a
productivity rate of two percent (naturally lower productivity growth rates
would require a larger response).

Conclusions
Employer-sponsored pensions and retiree medical benefits remain an
important source of retirement income, often providing incentives for
workers to retire as early as age 55. At the same time, as baby boomers
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Figure 7-5. Effect of strategies on retirement ages.
Source : Authors’ calculations assuming a 2 percent productivity growth rate for labor
gap estimates.

approach retirement, employers must confront an ever-tightening labor
market and some will want to keep older workers on the job. Unless
productivity growth is raised substantially, the productive sector must face
considerable staffing challenges.
Our work suggests that part of the gap can be filled by changing some of
the incentives built into programs for older workers. For instance, employers can continue to offer DB plans and retain their older workers by paring
early retirement subsidies. Modifying retiree health benefits can also have a
direct influence on retirement ages. Other strategies including the introduction of work/life programs can also have beneficial effects. Specifically,
the use of phased retirement and eldercare programs can provide positive
incentives for older workers to postpone retirement. We note that likely
responses to these programs differ by sex: men seem most responsive to
eldercare programs, while women are more responsive to phased retire-
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ment programs. Combined with strategies to boost labor force participation among the elderly and women overall, such efforts could help to
narrow the expected gap between labor supply and demand over the
coming decades.
Table 7-A1 Analysis of Retirement Plan Designs and Work/Life Benefits on
Retirement Age: Regression Results
Men

Women

With pension
only

With pension
and work/life

58.58

57.7

57.53

57.18

Salary over
$30,000
Age 62

0.38
(1.64)
3.35
(21.58)

0.51
(2.2)

0.83
(4.8)
3.1
(12.0)

0.74
(4.3)

Economic
Subsidy flag
Ratio PV of
early
retirement
benefit/PV of
normal
retirement
benefit

0.70
(5.4)
0.16
(6.13)

0.72
(5.6)
0.016
(6.3)

0.89
(3.4)
0.031
(9.12)

.838
(3.2)
.031
(8.98)

Retiree health
available

1.66
(3.72)

0.788
(1.7)

1.7
(7.8)

1.6
(5.46)

0.87
(8.10)

0.556
(3.2)

1.0
(7.93)

0.016
(0.19)

Intercept

Caps on retiree
health
premiums
Service related
premiums
Eldercare
program
available
Phased
retirement
available
Financial
planning avail.
Adj. R-square
N

With pension
only

0.74
(3.28)

1.01
(3.58)

1.21
(4.8)

0.891
(2.98)

0.65
(3.44)

0.105
(0.4)

0.42
(3.7)

1.8
(2.55)

.98
(4.65)
0.1992
3,433

With pension
and work/life

0.223
3,433

0.789
(2.57)
0.26
1,277

0.28
1,270
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Endnotes
The authors wish to thank Michael Slover for his research assistance. The opinions
and conclusions stated here are those of the authors and should not be construed to
be those of Watson Wyatt Worldwide or any of its other associates.
1. GDP is not a perfect measure of improved standards of living across this period,
in part because of the changing labor force behavior of women. For example, in
1946, fewer than half of working-age women in the USA were employed outside
the home whereas nearly 80 percent were employed during 2000. As women
entered the workforce, many tasks that were previously done by housewives and
not measured in the government’s calculation of GDP have been commercialized and are now included in measures of national output. GDP is also
uninformative about changing life patterns and environmental factors that affect
people’s lives nor does it reflect the distribution of output from an economy
across society.
2. Most projections begin with an estimate of the demand for goods and services
based on the size and composition of various sectors of the economy. We have
not developed our own macroeconomic projection model since there are several
widely used in government and business planning.
3. The CBO only provides estimates of future GDP growth till 2014. To account for
the last half of the next decade, our estimates assume that GDP will continue at
the pace of the last projection year provided by the CBO.
4. Some have argued that we are embarked on a ‘new’ paradigm in productivity
growth, but this conclusion has skeptics (Gordon 1999). It is unknown whether
recent productivity improvements are sustainable; prudence suggests, however,
that it is unwise to discount three decades of historical trend.
5. Our baseline projection assumes that current labor supply patterns at each age
would persist into the future. For example, since 45 percent of women between
the ages of 60 and 64 are in the labor force today, we assumed that 45 percent
of women aged 60–64 would be in the labor force over the coming decade as
well. In addition, we assumed that workers within each age group would continue working the same number of hours per year as they have in recent
years. Applying current labor force participation rates and work patterns to the
evolving population structure over the coming decade provides a reasonable
estimate of the labor supply for each year as a baseline for the remainder of
our analysis. By applying constant labor force participation rates in 2000 to
population shares over the coming decade, our baseline labor force is
projected to be 153.2 million in 2010. The BLS has made similar labor force
projections for the 16þ civilian labor force through 2012; it projects the
2012 labor force to be 162.2 million, while our baseline labor force is projected
to be 155.0 million (Toossi 2004; 48). The difference is caused by the BLS’s
expectations of a rather sizable increase in labor force participation rates for the
55þ age group.
6. We calculate FTE by dividing the total number of projected hours by a full-time
employment level of 2,000 hours per year.
7. See Nyce and Schieber (2002) for a detailed discussion on the USA; Nyce and
Schieber (2004) offer a broader look at other developed nations.
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8. Every two years, the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) publishes projections of
labor force growth anticipated over the coming decade. As a result, that office
must also estimate future changes in labor force participation rates. In their
most recent estimates, labor force participation rates for persons age 55þ will
rise from 34.5 percent in 2002 to 39.7 percent in 2012, equivalent to a 15
percent increase over the coming decade. In a separate analysis with our
model, we find that participation rates would need to rise by 39 percent
under the 1.5 percent productivity scenario, 26 percent under the 1.75 percent
scenario and 15 percent under the 2 percent scenario. This indicates that,
based on the BLS estimates of labor force growth, productivity rates would
need to rise by an annual two percent between 2002 and 2012 in order to
meet the output growth estimates set out by the Congressional Budget Office
(Toosi 2004).
9. Gustman et. al. (1994) sought to disaggregate these effects but used only the
existence of a subsidy, and not the size of the subsidy, as an independent
variable.
10. The actual size of the factor for an actuarially fair adjustment depends on the
specific discount and interest rates used.
11. Ippolito (1990) provides an excellent example of how these differ.
12. These studies suggest that retiree health insurance increases the probability
of early retirement by 30 to 80 percent, and reduces the age at retirement by
six to 24 months (cf. Gruber and Madrian 2002; Karoly and Rogowski 1994;
Blau and Gilleskie 2001). In a related study, Johnson et al. (1999) found that
the higher expected health insurance costs in retirement were the less likely a
worker will retire.
13. Based on authors’ analysis of Watson Wyatt Survey data on phased retirees.
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